Virtues

Virtues Towards Happiness.

“Now such a thing happiness, above all else, is held to be; for this we choose always for itself and never for the sake of something else, but honor, pleasure, reason, and every virtue we choose indeed for themselves (for if nothing resulted from them we should still choose each of them), but we choose them, also for the sake of happiness, judging that by means of them shall be happy. Happiness, on the other hand, no one chooses for the sake of these, nor, in general, for anything other than itself.”¹

Moral Virtue then cannot exist contradictory on our nature. For instance, the stone has a natural tendency downwards. Even you throw it, it cannot be habituated to rise by itself rather to go downwards eventually. “Since happiness is an activity of soul in accordance with perfect virtue, we must consider the nature of virtue; for perhaps we shall thus see better nature of happiness.”²

Virtue and Excellence

“…we state the function of man to be a rational principle, and the function of a good man to be the good and noble performance of these, and if any actions is well performed when it is performed in accordance with the appropriate excellence.”³

For instance, a harpist and a good harpist, they are generically the same. Obviously, the function of harpist is to play a harp and being good harpist is to play the harp well. “For if this is the case, human good turns out to be activity of soul in accordance with virtue, and if there are more than one virtue, in accordance with the best and most complete.”⁴

“…every virtue or excellence both bring into good condition the thing which it is the excellence and makes the work of that thing be done well; e.g. the excellence of the eye makes both the eye and its work good: for it is by the excellence of the eye that we see well.”⁵

Virtue: Intellectual and Moral

“Virtue, then, being of two kinds, intellectual and moral, intellectual virtue in the main owes both its birth and its growth to teaching (for which reason it requires experience and time), while moral virtue comes about as a result of habit, whence also its name (ethile) is one that is formed by a slight variation from the word ethos (habit).”⁶

Virtue: Golden Mean

Some moral virtue is concerned with feelings and actions. It involves excess, deficiency and a mean. For instance, Courage is a mean on the feeling of fear, between the deficiency of rashness and the excess of cowardice. We feel anger, sadness, or any pleasure or pain in general, too much or too little are both wrong. “…but to feel them at the right times, with reference to

the right objects, towards the right people, with the right motive, and in the right way, is what both intermediate and best, and this is characteristic of virtue.”⁷

“Virtue is concerned with passions and actions, in which excess is a form of failure, and so is defect, while the intermediate is praised and is a form of success; and being praised and being successful are both characteristics of virtue. Therefore, virtue is a kind of mean, it aims what is intermediate.”⁸

“Virtue is a state of character concerned with choice, lying in a mean, i.e., the mean relative to us, this being determined by a rational principle, and by that principle by which the man of practical wisdom would determine it. Now it is a mean between two vices, that which depends on excess and that which depends on defect.”⁹

Whether the subject of virtue is a power of the soul?

“I answer that, it can be proved in three ways that virtue belongs to a power of the soul. First, from the notion of the very essence of virtue, which implies perfection of a power; for perfection is in that which it perfects. Secondly, from the fact that virtue is an operative habit, as we have said above (Question 55, Article 2): for all operation proceeds from the soul through a power. Thirdly, from the fact that virtue disposes to that which is best: for the best is the end, which is either a thing’s operation, or something acquired by an operation proceeding from the thing’s power. Therefore, a power of the soul is the subject of virtue.”¹¹

Whether every virtue is a moral virtue?

“I answer that, In order to answer this question clearly, we must consider the meaning of the Latin word ‘mos’; for thus we shall be able to discover what a ‘moral’ virtue is. Now ‘mos’ has a twofold meaning. For sometimes it means custom, in which sense we read (Acts 15:1): ‘Except you be circumcised after the manner (morem) of Moses, you cannot be saved.’ Sometimes it means a natural or quasi-natural inclination to do some particular action, in which sense the word is applied to dumb animals. Thus we read (2 Macc. 1:2) that ‘rushing violently upon the enemy, like lions [*Leonum more,

i.e. as lions are in the habit of doing], they slew them’: and the word is used in the same sense in Ps. 67:7, where we read: ‘Who maketh men of one manner [moris] to dwell in a house.’ For both these significations there is but one word in Latin; but in the Greek there is a distinct word for each, for the word ‘ethos’ is written sometimes with a long, and sometimes a short ‘e’.

“Now ‘moral’ virtue is so called from ‘mos’ in the sense of a natural or quasi-natural inclination to do some particular action. And the other meaning of ‘mos,’ i.e. ‘custom,’ is akin to this: because custom becomes a second nature, and produces an inclination similar to a natural one. But it is evident that inclination to an action belongs properly to the appetitive power, whose function it is to move all the powers to their acts, as explained above. Therefore, not every virtue is a moral virtue, but only those that are in the appetitive faculty.”¹²

Whether moral virtue differs from intellectual virtue?

“I answer that, Reason is the first principle of all human acts; and whatever other principles of human acts may be found, they obey reason somewhat, but in various ways. For some obey reason blindly and without any contradiction whatever: such are the limbs of the body, provided they be in a healthy condition, for as soon as reason commands, the hand or the foot proceeds to action. Hence the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 3) that ‘the soul rules the body like a despot,’ i.e. as a master rules his slave, who has no right to rebel. Accordingly, some held that all the active principles in man are subordinate to reason in this way. If this were true, for man to act well it would suffice that his reason be perfect. Consequently, since virtue is a habit perfecting man in view of his doing good actions, it would follow that it is only in the reason, so that there would be none but intellectual virtues. This was the opinion of Socrates, who said “every virtue is a kind of prudence,” as stated in Ethic. vi, 13. Hence he maintained that as long as man is in possession of knowledge, he cannot sin; and that everyone who sins, does so through ignorance. Now this is based on a false supposition. Because the appetitive faculty obeys the reason, not blindly, but with a certain power of opposition; wherefore the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 3) that ‘reason commands the appetitive faculty by a politic power,’ whereby a man rules over subjects that are free, having a certain right of opposition. Hence Augustine says on Ps. 118 (Serm. 8) that ‘sometimes we understand [what is right] while desire is slow, or follows not at all,’ in so far as the habits or passions of the appetitive faculty cause the use of reason to be impeded in some particular action. And in this way, there is some truth in the saying of Socrates that so long as a man is in possession of knowledge he does not sin: provided, however, that this knowledge is made to include the use of reason in this individual act of choice.

Accordingly, for a man to do a good deed, it is requisite not only that his reason be well disposed by means of a habit of intellectual virtue; but also that his appetite be well disposed by means of a habit of moral virtue. And so moral differs from intellectual virtue, even as the appetite differs from the reason. Hence just as the appetite is the principle of human acts, in so far as it partakes of reason, so are moral habits to be considered virtues in so far as they are in conformity with reason.”¹³

Whether moral virtues can be without charity?

“I answer that, As stated above (Question 63, Article 2), it is possible by means of human works to acquire moral virtues, in so far as they produce good works that are directed to an end not surpassing the natural power of man: and when they are acquired thus, they can be without charity, even as they were in many of the Gentiles. But in so far as they produce good works in proportion to a supernatural last end, thus they have the character of virtue, truly and perfectly; and cannot be acquired by human acts, but are infused by God. Such like moral virtues cannot be without charity. For it has been stated above (Article 1; Question 58, Articles 4,5) that the other moral virtues cannot be without prudence; and that prudence cannot be without the moral virtues, because these latter make man well disposed to certain ends, which are the starting-point of the procedure of prudence. Now for prudence to proceed aright, it is much more necessary that man be well disposed towards his ultimate end, which is the effect of charity, than that he be well disposed in respect of other ends, which is the effect of moral virtue: just as in speculative matters right reason has greatest need of the first indemonstrable principle, that ‘contradictories cannot both be true at the same time.’ It is therefore evident that neither can infused prudence be without charity; nor, consequently, the other moral virtues, since they cannot be without prudence. It is therefore clear from what has been said that only the infused virtues are perfect, and deserve to be called virtues simply: since they direct man well to the ultimate end. But the other virtues, those, namely, that are acquired, are virtues in a restricted sense, but not simply: for they direct man well in respect of the last end in some particular genus of action, but not in respect of the last end simply. Hence a gloss of Augustine [Lib. Sentent. Prosperi cvi.] on the words, ‘All that is not of faith is sin’ (Rm. 14:23), says: ‘He that fails to acknowledge the truth, has no true virtue, even if his conduct be good.’”¹⁴

FOOTNOTES

¹Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics 1.7.1097b5

²Ibid., 1.13.1102a5.

³Ibid., 1.7.1098a 10-15.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics 2.6.1106a15.

⁶Ibid., 2.1.1103a15.

⁷Ibid., 2.1.106a20.

⁸Ibid., 2.6.1106b20-25.

⁹Ibid. 2.6.1107a.

¹⁰ST I-II, q.55. a.4.

¹¹ST I-II, q.56. a.1.

¹²ST I-II, q.58. a.1.

¹³ST I-II, q.58, a.2.

¹⁴ST I-II, q.65. a.2.

Read further: Aquinas: Moral Philosophy | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (utm.edu)