On Human Freedom
St. Augustine’s Freedom
“The souls in bliss will possess the freedom of will, though sin will have no power to temp them. They will be more free than ever-so free, in fact, from all delight in sinning as to find, in not sinning, an unfailing source of joy. By the freedom which was given to the man, who was constituted in rectitude, he could choose either to sin or not to sin; in eternity, freedom is that more potent freedom which makes all sin impossible. Such freedom, of course, is a gift of God,
beyond the power of nature to achieve. For, it is one thing to be God, another to be a sharer in the divine nature. God, by His nature, cannot sin, but a mere sharer in His nature must receive from God such immunity from sin. It was proper that, in the process
of Divine endowment, the first step should be a freedom even from the power to sin. The first gift made merit possible; the second is part of man’s reward. Our nature, when it was free to sin, did sin.
It took a greater grace to lead us to that larger liberty
which frees us from the very power to sin. Just as the immortality that Adam lost by his sin was, at first, a mere possibility of avoiding death, but, in heaven, becomes the impossibility of death, so free will was, at first, a mere possibility of avoiding sin, but, in heaven, becomes an utter inability to sin.1”
On Human Will
“Our will be as ineradicably rooted in rectitude and love as in beatitude. It is true that, with Adam’s sin, we lost our right to grace and glory, but with our right, we did not lose our longing to be happy. And, as for freedom, can we think that God himself, who certainly cannot sin, is therefore without freedom? The conclusion is that in the everlasting City, there will remain in each and all of us an inalienable freedom of the will, emancipating us from every evil and filling us with every good, rejoicing in the inexhaustible beatitude of everlasting happiness, unclouded by the memory of any sin or of sanction suffered, yet with no forgetfulness of our redemption nor any loss of gratitude for our Redeemer.”2
Freewill and Sin
“Our freedom is this: “to submit to this truth, which is our God Who set us free from death – that
is, from the state of sin. Truth itself, speaking as a human being among others, said to those believing in Him: “If you continue in my
word, you are truly my disciples; and you shall know the truth, and the truth shall set you free” [Jn. 8:31–32]. “The soul does not enjoy anything with freedom unless it enjoys it with security.”3
Augustine’s concept of freedom cannot be addressed without also examining his understanding of sin and grace. These concepts interrelate in such a dynamic way that freedom’s very nature is inexorably bound up with them. Freedom is not just a state of free will, it is actually the result of grace delivering individuals from the consequences of sin. Sin is not just that which generates the breach between humanity and God, it is also the penalty for and manifestation of that breach. And, in bridging this gap, grace is not only that which makes the good knowable, it is also that which makes the good capable of being done. Because of the nearly circular structure of Augustine’s thought on this subject, we will begin with his concept of freedom, then examine the process and dynamic response of grace to sin, which will eventually return us to the state of actualized freedom.
“As He is Creator of all nature, so is He the giver of all powers-though He is not the maker of all choices. Evil choices are not from him, for they are contrary to the nature which is from Him. Thus, bodies are subject to wills. Some bodies are subject to our wills-to the wills of all mortal animals, but especially those of men rather than of beasts.
“Some bodies are subject to the will of angels. And absolutely all bodies are subject to the will of God; as, indeed, are all wills, too, since they have no power save what He gave them.
“Thus, God is the Cause of all things – a cause that makes but is not made. Other causes make, but they are themselves made-for example, all created spirits and, especially, rational spirits. Material causes which are rather passive than active are not to be included among efficient cause, for their power is limited to what the wills of spirits work thought them.
“It does not follow, therefore, that the order of causes, known for certain thought it is in the foreknowing mind of God, brings it about that is no power in our will, since our choices themselves have an important place in the order of causes. And so, let Cicero argue with those who hold that this order of causes is fixed by fate, or, rather, is the reality they call fate. Our main objection is to the word fate, which is usually given a false sense. As for Cicero, we object to him even more than the Stoics do when he denies that the order of all causes is fixed and clearly known in the foreknowledge of God. Cicero must either deny that God exist-and this, in fact, is what he attempts to do in the name of Cotta in his work On the Nature of the God-or else, if he admits God’s existence while denying His foreknowledge, what he says amounts to nothing more than what ‘the fool hath said in his heart: there is no God.’ The fact is that one who does not foreknow the whole of the future is most certainly not God.
“Our conclusion is that our wills have power to do all that God wanted them to do all that God wanted them to do and foresaw they could do. Their power, such as it is, is a real power. What they are to do them themselves will most certainly do because God foresaw both that they could do it and that they would do it and His knowledge cannot be mistaken. Thus, if I wanted to use the word ‘fate’ for anything at all, I should prefer to say that ‘fate’ is the action of a weak person, while ‘choice’ is the act of the stronger man who holds the weak man in his power, rather than to admit that the choice of our will is taken away by that order of causes which the Stoics arbitrary call fate.”4
No one, therefore, need seek for an efficient cause of an evil will. Since the ‘effect’ is, in fact a deficiency, the cause should be called ‘deficient.’ The fault of an evil will begins when one falls from Supreme Being to some being which is less than absolute. Trying to discover causes of such deficiencies-causes which, as I have said, are not efficient but deficient-is like trying to see darkness or hear silence. True, we have some knowledge of both darkness or hear silence. True, we have some knowledge of both darkness and silence: of the former only by the eyes; of the latter only by the ears. Nevertheless, we have no sensation but only the privation of sensation.
So there is no point in anyone trying to learn from me what I know I do not know-unless, perhaps, he wants to know how not to know what, as he ought to know, no one can know. For, things we know, not by sensation, but by the absence of sensation, are known-if the word says or means anything-by some kind of ‘unknowing,’ so that they are both known and not known at the same time. For example, when the vision of the eye passes from sensation to sensation, it sees darkness only when it begins not to see. So, too, no other sense but the ear can perceive silence, yet silence can only be heard by not being heard.
St. Thomas on Human Freedom
Human freedom was discussed by St. Thomas Aquinas in his Summa Theologica. The following objections was answered by ST. Thomas whether the will of man is pulled towards an end that God determined.
“Whether the will is moved to anything naturally?
“Objection 1: It would seem that the will is not moved to anything naturally. For the natural agent is condivided with the voluntary agent, as stated at the beginning of Phys. ii,
- Therefore the will is not moved to anything naturally.
“Objection 2: Further, that which is natural is in a thing always: as ‘being hot’ is in fire. But no movement is always in the will. Therefore no movement is natural to the will.
“Objection 3: Further, nature is determinate to one thing: whereas the will is referred to opposites. Therefore the will wills nothing naturally.
“On the contrary, The movement of the will follows the movement of the intellect. But the intellect understands some things naturally. Therefore the will, too, wills some things naturally.
“I answer that, As Boethius says (De Duabus Nat.) and the Philosopher also (Metaph. v, 4) the word ‘nature” is used in a manifold sense. For sometimes it stands for the intrinsic principle in movable things. In this sense nature is either matter or the material form, as stated in Phys. ii, 1. In another sense nature stands for any substance, or even for any being. And in this sense, that is said to be natural to a thing which befits it in respect of its substance. And this is that which of itself is in a thing. Now all things that do not of themselves belong to the thing in which they are, are reduced to something which belongs of itself to that thing, as to their principle. Wherefore, taking nature in this sense, it is necessary that the principle of whatever belongs to a thing, be a natural principle. This is evident in regard to the intellect: for the principles of intellectual knowledge are naturally known. In like manner the principle of voluntary movements must be something naturally willed.
“Now this is good in general, to which the will tends naturally, as does each power to its object; and again it is the last end, which stands in the same relation to things appetible, as the first principles of demonstrations to things intelligible: and, speaking generally, it is all those things which belong to the willer according to his nature. For it is not only things pertaining to the will that the will desires, but also that which pertains to each power, and to the entire man. Wherefore man wills naturally not only the object of the will, but also other things that are appropriate to the other powers; such as the knowledge of truth, which befits the intellect; and to be and to live and other like things which regard the natural well- being; all of which are included in the object of the will, as so many particular goods.
“Reply to Objection 1: The will is distinguished from nature as one kind of cause from another; for some things happen naturally and some are done voluntarily. There is, however, another manner of causing that is proper to the will, which is mistress of its act, besides the manner proper to nature, which is determinate to one thing. But since the will is founded on some nature, it is necessary that the movement proper to nature be shared by the will, to some extent: just as what belongs to a previous cause is shared by a subsequent cause. Because in every thing, being itself, which is from nature, precedes volition, which is from the will. And hence it is that the will wills something naturally.
“Reply to Objection 2: In the case of natural things, that which is natural, as a result of the form only, is always in them actually, as heat is in fire. But that which is natural as a result of matter, is not always in them actually, but sometimes only in potentiality: because form is act, whereas matter is potentiality. Now movement is ‘the act of that which is in potentiality’ (Aristotle, Phys. iii, 1). Wherefore that which belongs to, or results from, movement, in regard to natural things, is not always in them. Thus fire does not always move upwards, but only when it is outside its own place. [*The Aristotelian theory was that fire’s proper place is the fiery heaven, i.e. the Empyrean.] And in like manner it is not necessary that the will (which is reduced from potentiality to act, when it wills something), should always be in the act of volition; but only when it is in a certain determinate disposition. But God’s will, which is pure act, is always in the act of volition.
“Reply to Objection 3: To every nature there is one thing corresponding, proportionate, however, to that nature. For to nature considered as a genus, there corresponds something one generically; and to nature as species there corresponds something one specifically; and to the individualized nature there corresponds some one individual. Since, therefore, the will is an immaterial power like the intellect, some one general thing corresponds to it, naturally which is the good; just as to the intellect there corresponds some one general thing, which is the true, or being, or ‘what a thing is.’ And under good in general are included many particular goods, to none of which is the will determined. 5
“Whether the will is moved of necessity by the exterior mover which is God?
“Objection 1: It would seem that the will is moved of necessity by God. For every agent that cannot be resisted moves of necessity. But God cannot be resisted, because His power is infinite; wherefore it is written (Rom. 9:19): ‘Who resisteth His will?’ Therefore, God moves the will of necessity.
“Objection 2: Further, the will is moved of necessity to whatever it wills naturally, as stated above (A[2], ad 3). But ‘whatever God does in a thing is natural to it,’ as Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxvi, 3). Therefore, the will wills of necessity everything to which God moves it.
“Objection 3: Further, a thing is possible, if nothing impossible follows from its being supposed. But something impossible follows from the supposition that the will does not will that to which God moves it: because in that case God’s operation would be ineffectual. Therefore it is not possible for the will not to will that to which God moves it. Therefore it wills it of necessity.
“On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 15:14): ‘God made man from the beginning, and left him in the hand of his own counsel.’ Therefore He does not of necessity move man’s will.
“I answer that, As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) ‘it belongs to Divine providence, not to destroy but to preserve the nature of things.’ Wherefore it moves all things in accordance with their conditions; so that from necessary causes through the Divine motion, effects follow of necessity; but from contingent causes, effects follow contingently. Since, therefore, the will is an active principle, not determinate to one thing, but having an indifferent relation to many things, God so moves it, that He does not determine it of necessity to one thing, but its movement remains contingent and not necessary, except in those things to which it is moved naturally.
“Reply to Objection 1: The Divine will extends not only to the doing of something by the thing which He moves, but also to its being done in a way which is fitting to the nature of that thing. And therefore it would be more repugnant to the Divine motion, for the will to be moved of necessity, which is not fitting to its nature; than for it to be moved freely, which is becoming to its nature.
“Reply to Objection 2: That is natural to a thing, which God so works in it that it may be natural to it: for thus is something becoming to a thing, according as God wishes it to be becoming. Now He does not wish that whatever He works in things should be natural to them, for instance, that the dead should rise again. But this He does wish to be natural to each thing—that it be subject to the Divine power.
“Reply to Objection 3: If God moves the will to anything, it is incompatible with this supposition, that the will be not moved thereto. But it is not impossible simply. Consequently it does not follow that the will is moved by God necessarily.”6
Read Further: Saint Augustine (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) | Freedom — Aquinas 101 (thomisticinstitute.org)