The Morality of Human Acts
The words ethics and morality are often used interchangeably. “Morality and ethics have same roots, mores which means manner and customs from the Latin and etos which means custom and habits from the Greek. Morality is used to refer to what we would call moral standards and moral conduct while ethics is used to refer to the formal study of those standards and conduct. For this reason, the study of ethics is also often called “moral philosophy.”
Acts of Man
“If a thing has no knowledge of the end, even though it have an intrinsic principle of action or movement, nevertheless the principle of acting or being moved for an end is not in that thing, but in something else, by which the principle of its action towards an end is not in that thing, but in something else, by which the principle of its action towards an end is imprinted on it.”1
Human Acts
“That acts are called human, inasmuch as they proceed from a deliberate will.”
“Human acts are those of which a man is master, which he has the power of doing or not doing as he pleases. True, we are physically free to perform certain acts or to omit them — to do one thing or its contrary, to choose this act rather than some other; but are we also morally free in regard to all such acts? Is it right for me on all occasions to do whatever my inclination prompts me to do? My reason plainly answers, No: it is evident even to a child that some actions are good in themselves, morally good, and others bad in themselves, morally bad. The good acts our reason commends and approves; these we call right. Evil acts, on the contrary, our reason disapproves and blames; these we call wrong. The ideas of right and wrong, like those of truth and falsity,
substance and accident, cause and effect are “primary ideas” which are common to all men; hence, they are trustworthy ideas — that is, the distinction existing in the mind between right and wrong corresponds to a distinction existing objectively in human acts.”
“The reason why our intellect approves certain acts, calls them morally good and pronounces them worthy of praise, precisely as free acts, is because it perceives that they are rightly directed to their true end, suitable to and worthy of a rational agent, conformable to the exigencies of things, and therefore that they ought to be done by man: man ought to do what is conformable to his rational nature and conducive to his perfection.” Our intellect disapproves of other acts, calls them morally bad or evil and pronounces them to be, inasmuch as they are free acts, deserving of blame, because it perceives they are directed away from their true end, are unbecoming and unsuitable to a rational agent, at variance with the exigencies of things, and therefore not to be done by man: man ought not to do that which is unworthy of a rational being, and which, instead of perfecting, debases him.”
St. Thomas on Human Acts
“Since therefore Happiness is to be gained by means of certain acts, we must in due sequence consider human acts, in order to know by what acts we may obtain Happiness, and by what acts we are prevented from obtaining it. But because operations and acts are concerned with things singular, consequently all practical knowledge is incomplete unless it take account of things in detail. The study of Morals, therefore, since it treats of human acts, should consider first the general principles; and secondly matters of detail.
In treating of the general principles, the points that offer themselves for our consideration are (1) human acts themselves; (2) their principles.
Now of human acts, some are proper to man; others are common to man and animals. And since Happiness is man’s proper good, those acts which are proper to man have a closer connection with Happiness than have those which are common to man and the other animals.
First, then, we must consider those acts which are proper to man; secondly, those acts which are common to man and the other animals, and are called Passions. The first of these points offers a twofold consideration: (1) What makes a human act? (2) What distinguishes human acts?
“There must needs be something voluntary in human acts. In order to make this clear, we must take note that the principle of some acts or movements is within the agent, or that which is moved; whereas the principle of some movements or acts is outside. For when a stone is moved upwards, the principle of this movement is outside the stone: whereas when it is moved downwards, the principle of this movement is in the stone. Now of those things that are moved by an intrinsic principle, some move themselves, some not. For since every agent or thing moved, acts or is moved for an end, as stated above (Q[1], A[2]); those are perfectly moved by an intrinsic principle, whose intrinsic principle is one not only of movement but of movement for an end.
Now in order for a thing to be done for an end, some knowledge of the end is necessary. Therefore, whatever so acts or is moved by an intrinsic principle, that it has some knowledge of the end, has within itself the principle of its act, so that it not only acts, but acts for an end. On the other hand, if a thing has no knowledge of the end, even though it have an intrinsic principle of action or
movement, nevertheless the principle of acting or being moved for an end is not in that thing, but in something else, by which the principle of its action towards an end is not in that thing, but in something else, by which the principle of its action towards an end is imprinted on it. Wherefore such like things are not said to move themselves, but to be moved by others.
But those things which have a knowledge of the end are said to move themselves because there is in them a principle by which they not only act but also act for an end. And consequently, since both are from an intrinsic principle, to wit, that they act and that they act for an end, the movements of such things are said to be voluntary: for the word “voluntary” implies that their movements and acts are from their own inclination. Hence it is that, according to the definitions of Aristotle, Gregory of Nyssa, and Damascene [*See Objection 1], the voluntary is defined not only as having “a principle within” the agent,
but also as implying “knowledge.” Therefore, since man especially knows the end of his work, and moves himself, in his acts especially is the voluntary to be found.”
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Book:
Aquinas, Thomas. Summa Theologiae. Complete English Edition in Five Volumes. Vol. 1. trans. Fathers of the English Dominican
Province. New York: Benziger Bros., 1948.
Electronic Source:
Dodig-Crnkovic. Gordana. Lecture on Ethics, Professionalism And Criticism Of The Source. Sweden: Mälardalen University, 2007.
Internet Source:
Web. Coppens, Charles S.J., “JMC: Moral Philosophy”. University Of Nortre Dome. 6 January 2014.