BEING – STARTING POINT OF METAPHYSICS

BEING – THE STARTING POINT OF METAPHYSICS.

Etymology of the word Metaphysics

“The name ‘Metaphysics’ (which literally means ‘beyond Physics’) was coined by Andronicus of Rhodes in order to designate Aristotle’s works on ‘First Philosophy,’ which were placed after his books on Physics. The name aptly expresses the nature of this science, which goes beyond the sphere of material reality studied by Physics.”¹

Definition of Metaphysics

“Now because a science should investigate not only its subject but also the proper accidents of its subject, he [Aristotle] therefore says, first, that there is a science which studies being as being, as its subject, and studies also ‘the attributes which necessarily belong to being,’ i.e., its proper accidents. He says ‘as being’ because the other sciences, which deal with particular beings, do indeed consider being (for all the subjects of the sciences are beings),yet they do not consider being as being, but as some particular kind of being, for example, number or line or fire or the like.”²

The Material/Formal Object of Metaphysics

“Hence, it can be said that the material object of metaphysics is reality in its entirety, for all things whatever their nature may be – are beings. On the other hand, its formal object is ‘being as being’ or ‘being as such.’”³

Primary Divisions of Being: Real and Mental

1. Real Being

“It is that which is present by its own intrinsic act of existence outside of an idea, i.e., not just as being thought about. It is what exists, in the strong sense of the term, and is the ordinary meaning of being unless otherwise specified.”

Two main modes of Real Being:

Substance

“But substance is a being in an unqualified sense and exists of itself, whereas all classes of beings other than substance are beings in an unqualified sense and exist by reason of substance. Therefore, substance is the primary kind of being.”⁵

“This can be said simply to be as a whole entity subsisting in itself and not as a part of another.”⁶

Accident

“Now accidents signified in the abstract seem to be non-beings, because no one of them is fitted by nature to exist of itself. In fact, the being of each of them consists in their existing in something else, and no one of them is capable of existing apart from substance.”⁷

2. Mental Being

“It is that which is present not by its own act of existence but only within an idea, i.e. as being thought about.”⁸ (e.g. pink fluffy unicorn dancing on a rainbow.) Unicorn is a mental being. It only exists in the mind.

Necessary Being and Contingent Being

Necessary Being

“Every necessary being, however, either has the cause of its necessity in an outside source or, if it does not, it is necessary through itself. But one cannot proceed to infinity among necessary beings the cause of whose necessity lies in an outside source. We must therefore posit a first necessary being, which is necessary through itself. This is God, since, as we have shown, He is the first cause.”⁹

Contingent Being

“We find in the world, furthermore, certain beings, those namely that are subject to generation and corruption, which can be and not-be. But what can be has a cause because, since it is equally related to two contraries, namely, being and non-being, it must be owing to some cause that being accrues to it.”¹⁰

Infinity and Finitude

“We must consider therefore that a thing is called infinite because it is not finite. Now, matter is in a way made finite by form, and the form by matter. Matter indeed is made finite by form, inasmuch as matter, before it receives its form, is in potentiality to many forms; but on receiving a form, it is terminated by that one. Again, form is made finite by matter, inasmuch as form, considered in itself, is common to many; but when received in matter, the form is determined to this one particular thing. Now, matter is perfected by the form by which it is made finite; therefore, infinite as attributed to matter, has the nature of something imperfect; for it is as it were formless matter.

On the other hand, form is not made perfect by matter, but rather is contracted by matter; and hence the infinite, regarded on the part of the form not determined by matter, has the nature of something perfect. Now being is the most formal of all things, as appears from what is shown above (Q[4], A[1], OBJ[3]). Since therefore the divine being is not a being received in anything, but He is His own subsistent being as was shown above (Q[3], A[4]), it is clear that God Himself is infinite and perfect.”¹¹

Absolute and Relative Infinity

“Things other than God can be relatively infinite, but not absolutely infinite. For with regard to infinite as applied to matter, it manifests that everything actually existing possesses a form; and thus, its matter is determined by form. But because matter, considered as existing under some substantial form, remains in potentiality to many accidental forms, what is absolutely finite can be relatively infinite; as, for example, wood is finite according to its own form, but still it is relatively infinite, inasmuch as it is in potentiality to an infinite number of shapes. But if we speak of the infinite in reference to form, it manifests that those things, the forms of which are in matter, are absolutely finite, and in no way infinite.

If, however, any created forms are not received into matter, but are self-subsisting, as some think is the case with angels, these will be relatively infinite, inasmuch as such kinds of forms are not terminated, nor contracted by any matter. But because a created form thus subsisting has being, and yet is not its own being, it follows that its being is received and contracted to a determinate nature. Hence it cannot be absolutely infinite.”¹²

Non-Existence, Non-Being, and Nothing

“[B]y non-existence we understand not simply those things which do not exist, but those which are potential, and not actual.”¹³

“[F]or what is relative being (as a potentiality) is non-being absolutely, i.e. actually; or what is absolute being in the genus of substance, is non-being relatively as regards some accidental being.”¹⁴

“Consider, now, the question, ‘Can nothing exist?’ There are at least two possible characteristic responses, according to at least two possible interpretations of the sense of the question: (1) ‘Yes, nothing can exist’ in the sense of ‘Yes, it is possible that there be nothing in existence, i.e., it is not necessary that any of these things which I see about me be in existence, though it is a fact that they do exist.’ (2) ‘No, nothing cannot exist’ in the sense of ‘No, that which is an absence of all things which exists simply, i.e., in the way in which Jack exists, cannot exist.’ To use the word ‘nothing’ in this last sense – i.e., in the sense of an absence of all things which exist simply – is not to indicate that these simply existing things are too be found elsewhere any more than to speak of the absence of sight in a blind man’s eyes is to indicate that his sight is to be found elsewhere. Absence, here, is absence in a strong sense, in the sense of a negation; and negation, here, may be taken in at least two senses, which give us two strong senses of the word ‘nothing:’ (1) what does not exist and (2) what neither is nor can be.”¹⁵

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FOOTNOTES

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¹Tomas Alvira, Luis Clavell, and Tomas Melendo, Metaphysics: Understanding the Science of Being, trans. Fr.Luis Supan (Makati City: Sinag-tala Publishers, 2011), 9.

²St. Thomas Aquinas Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle I. 4. 1. 529-530.

³Alvira, Clavell, Melendo, Metaphysics, 7.

⁴W. Norris Clarke, S.J., Central Problems of Metaphysics, ed. Nemesio Que, S.J., (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University, 2001), 10.

⁵St. Thomas Aquinas Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle II. 7. 1. 1248.

⁶Clarke, Central Problems of Metaphysics, 10.

⁷Thomas Aquinas Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle II. 7. 1. 1253.

⁸Clarke, Central Problems of Metaphysics, 10.

⁹St. Thomas Aquinas Summa Contra Gentiles I. 15. 5.

¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹ST I, q.7. a.1.

¹²ST I, q.7. a.2.

¹³ST I, q.5. a.2.

¹⁴ST I, q.11, a.2.

¹⁵Joseph Bobik, “Two Uses of the Word ‘Being’: (1) Apropos of Real Things and (2) Apropos of the Truth of Propositions,” in St. Thomas Aquinas On Being and Essence, trans. and interpreted by Joseph Bobik (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1965), 34-35.

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See also : Metaphysics (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)