Short vs Iran (US vs Iran) 1987.
Facts
On 11 April 1977 the Claimant began employment in Iran with Lockheed Aircraft Service Company (“Lockheed”) pursuant to a two-year contract of employment as the Director of the Aircraft Engine Management Division in Iran. He commenced this employment intending to renew his contract and stay in Iran for at least five years.
According to the Petitioner following the onset of the Islamic Revolution in late 1978 and the subsequent declaration of martial law was made him almost under house arrest, he then lives with progressively increasing stress caused by threats against the lives of Americans, shooting people in the streets, firebombing of American homes and automobiles, and other violence propagated by revolutionaries against Americans.
On 1 December 1978 a letter was allegedly found posted on Lockheed bulletin boards stating that American personnel and their dependants were being given for one month to leave Iran and that any remaining employees would be considered as enemies and fought with categorically. The letter had further stated that lists of addresses of foreigners were being made in preparation “for struggle.”
It is alleged that in response to the anti-American exhortations of Ayatollah Khomeini and other religious leaders and as a result of the U.S. Government’s support for the Shah, Americans were removed in the course of the Islamic Revolution and threatened, harassed, beaten and in the most tragic cases, murdered, by the followers of Ayatollah Khomeini. American homes were subjected to attacks and their property stolen.
On 4 January 1979 the Claimant was informed by his employer that his dependents would be evacuated from Iran the next day. The Claimant, however, remained in Iran and continued his employment with Lockheed.
Nonetheless, The situation became worse daily and on 4 February 1979 the Claimant was notified by Lockheed to pack his personal belongings and be ready to be evacuated from Iran on 6 February 1979. In fact scheduled flights were cancelled and he was evacuated by the United States Air Force on 8 February 1979.
The Claimant’s employment with Lockheed was terminated effective 9 February 1979. The Claimant alleges that this termination was without cause on his part and solely due to his forced evacuation. The Claimant alleges that his departure amounts to a wrongful expulsion from Iran, for which Iran is liable.
Issue:
Whether the facts invoked by the Claimant as having caused his departure from Iran are attributable to Iran, either directly, or indirectly as a result of its deliberate policies.
Held:
No. As a rule, in the classical case the expulsion of an alien is affected by a legal order issued by the State authorities obligating the alien to leave the host country or otherwise be forcibly removed.
An expulsion can also be the result of a forcible action of the police or other state organ not authorized by a legal order issued by the competent authorities.
Finally, an alien may also be considered wrongfully expelled in the absence of any order or specific state action, when, in the circumstances of the case, the alien could reasonably be regarded as having no other choice than to leave and when the acts leading to his departure were attributable to the State. The common thread is that the international responsibility of a State can be engaged where the circumstances or events causing the departure of the alien are attributable to it.
On the other hand, to assume that all the departures of all aliens of a certain nationality from a country, during a certain period of political turmoil, would be attributable to the State, unless the State is able to demonstrate the contrary, would contradict the principles and rules of the international responsibility of States.
On the present case, the Tribunal has to take into account the existence of a revolutionary situation in Iran during the period under consideration. The reports that many thousands of Iranians lost their lives in the course of these revolutionary events is an indicator of the magnitude of the turmoil associated with the Revolution. As a result of this turmoil, the successive governments appointed by the Shah lost control over events and the last of them was eventually overthrown. The strong anti-American sentiment documented in the Claimant’s Factual Memorial was the consequence of this belief, and gave to Americans present in Iran reason to believe that their lives were in danger. This also explains why the American Ambassador in Tehran and U.S. employers in Iran strongly urged dependants of U.S. employees and other non-essential Americans to leave Iran.
It is a rule that where a revolution leads to the establishment of a new government the State is held responsible for the acts of the overthrown government insofar as the latter-maintained control of the situation. The successor government is also held responsible for the acts imputable to the revolutionary movement which established it, even if those acts occurred prior to its establishment, as a consequence of the continuity existing between the new organization of the State and the organization of the revolutionary movement.
These rules are of decisive importance in the present Case, since the Claimant departed from Iran on 8 February 1979, a few days before the proclamation on 11 February of the Islamic Revolutionary Government. At that time, the revolutionary movement had not yet been able to establish control over any part of Iranian territory, and the Government had demonstrated its loss of control.
The Claimant’s reliance on the declarations made by the leader of the Revolution and other spokesmen of the revolutionary movement, also lacks the essential ingredient as being the cause for the Claimant’s departure in circumstances amounting to an expulsion.
The Court recognized that prior to the attack against the U.S. Embassy “the Ayatollah Khomeini, the religious leader of the country, had made several public declarations inveighing against the United States as responsible for all his country’s problems.” Nevertheless, the Court found that “it would be going too far to interpret such general declarations… as amounting to an authorization from the State to undertake the specific operation of invading and seizing the United States Embassy.” Similarly, it cannot be said that the declarations referred to by the Claimant amounted to an authorization to revolutionaries to act in such a way that the Claimant should be forced to leave Iran forthwith. Nor is there any evidence that any action prompted by such statements was the cause of the Claimant’s decision to leave Iran. In these circumstances, the Tribunal is of the view that the Claimant has failed to prove that his departure from Iran can be imputed to the wrongful conduct of Iran.
The claim is therefore dismissed.
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